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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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________________ 
 
No. 12-1331 
________________ 
 
SHENECQUA BUTT; ALLEGRA KING*; TANYA MITCHELL; 
THERESA C. HOWARD; ELLEN BROWN BRONSON, 
 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS 
OF AMERICA; EDWARD CORYELL; MARK DURKALEC 
 
      *(Dismissed per Court Order of 1/30/13) 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-04285) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson  
________________ 
 
Argued January 7, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 31, 2013) 
 
Ryan M. Paddick, Esquire  (Argued) 
81 Lancaster Avenue, Suite 220 
Malvern, PA   19355 
 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
Marc L. Gelman, Esquire  (Argued) 
Jennings Sigmond, P.C. 
510 Walnut Street 
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The Penn Mutual Towers, 16th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA   19106 
 
 Counsel for Appellees 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Appellants jointly appeal the District Court‘s order granting summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants and dismissing their consolidated case.  We hold that summary 
judgment was inappropriate, and thus vacate and remand for further proceedings.   
I. 
As we write for the parties, we set forth only those facts necessary to our opinion.  
Appellants Shenecqua Butt, Tanya Mitchell, Theresa Howard, and Ellen Bronson are 
female, African-American carpenters.  They brought suit against their union—the 
Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters, Southeastern Pennsylvania, State of 
Delaware and Eastern Shore of Maryland, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of 
America (―the Union‖)—as well as its Business Agent, Mark Durkalec, and its Business 
Manager, Edward Coryell.  Appellants allege that, in making job referrals, Defendants 
discriminated against them on the basis of race and gender in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and because of race in violation of 
42 U.S.C. § 1981.  They also allege retaliation under both provisions.
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 Appellant Bronson does not allege retaliation, although she alone brought suit for race 
and sex discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (―PHRA‖), 43 P.S. 
§ 951 et seq.   
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In support of their discrimination claims, Appellants provided statistics comparing 
the annual hours worked by men and women in the Union.  Although the numbers were 
not subjected to any expert statistical analysis, we note that there were many instances in 
which each individual Appellant‘s annual hours exceeded the average hours worked by 
male and female carpenters, and all five Appellants exceeded both averages in 2006.  
However, the average annual hours worked by women dropped significantly in the years 
2007 and 2008 while the hours worked by men remained relatively constant from the 
preceding years.   
Appellants also offered testimony regarding statements made by Defendants.  
Specifically, Butt testified that Durkalec informed her on multiple occasions that ―‗I got 
these jobs but . . . I can‘t give them to you,‘‖ Butt Dep. 251:7–252:21, Feb. 11, 2011, and 
that she was instead offered jobs ―[t]hat the men don‘t want,‖ id. at 203:9–205:25.  
Moreover, Bronson testified that, in response to job queries, Durkalec replied that ―my 
people are still out of work.‖  Bronson Dep., 29:1–11, May 3, 2011.  Bronson interpreted 
this comment ―to mean [she] was not a white man and those were the ones that [were] his 
people,‖ and that she ―was not a part of that [clique].‖  Id. at 30:1–4.  She ―felt as though 
[she] was being discriminated against because of that fact.‖  Id. at 30:4–6.           
Appellants—excluding Bronson—allege that this drop in hours also was in 
retaliation for their protected activities, which included filing charges of discrimination 
against the Union with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, making 
complaints directly to the Union, and testifying before the Philadelphia Mayor‘s 
Advisory Commission on Construction Industry Diversity.  Additionally, following Butt 
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and Mitchell‘s testimony before the Mayor‘s Commission, Durkalec forwarded a letter to 
the media explaining that the two had been laid off previously for poor work 
performance.     
 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and 
dismissed the action.   
II. 
The District Court had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.    
―We exercise plenary review over a District Court‘s grant of summary 
judgment . . . .‖  Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 545 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citation omitted).  ―We will affirm if our review shows ‗that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‘‖  
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 689 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a)).  When determining whether there is any such genuine issue of material fact, the 
record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Heightened 
Independence & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 693 F.3d 345, 351 (3d Cir. 
2012).   
III. 
Title VII makes it unlawful for a labor organization to ―discriminate against‖ or 
―fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities . . . because of such 
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individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.‖2  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1)–
(2). 
The District Court concluded that the Appellants had not made out their prima 
facie case because they had not exhibited any ―causal nexus between Defendants‘ 
conduct and the ‗adverse employment actions.‘‖  Butt v. United Broth. of Carpenters & 
Joiners of Am., No. 09-4285, 2012 WL 360554, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2012).  
Specifically, the Court concluded that even if the statistics did indicate an illicit hiring 
preference, there were no facts implicating the Union in any disproportionality, and that 
there was no empirical evidence suggesting favoritism based on race.  The Court instead 
opined that the ―Plaintiffs seem to be pursuing the wrong defendants.‖  Id.  As for the 
retaliation claims, the Court found sufficient protected activities, but concluded that 
Appellants had failed to present ―evidence tending to show that the putative adverse 
employment actions were taken or even influenced by Defendants.‖  Id. at *11 (emphasis 
in original).   
Although the District Court applied a pretext analysis pursuant to McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), we see no reason why the Appellants 
could not have proceeded at this stage under a mixed-motive discrimination theory 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).  See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 
2008) (―A Title VII plaintiff may state a claim for discrimination under either the pretext 
theory . . . or the mixed-motive theory . . . .‖).  In either event, we see at least one genuine 
                                              
2
 The PHRA is ―construed consistently with interpretations of Title VII,‖ Gomez v. 
Allegheny Health Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995), as are actions under § 
1981, Schurr v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 499 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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dispute of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment:  Defendant 
Durkalec‘s statement that his people were still out of work.  Although the District Court 
interpreted this ―seemingly inappropriate‖ statement to mean ―merely that Durkalec did 
not personally identify with black female carpenters,‖ Butt, 2012 WL 360554, at *9, this 
conflicted with Appellant Bronson‘s interpretation, which appears to be the only 
interpretation we can find in the record.  In light of this genuine dispute, summary 
judgment was inappropriate on the claims of race and gender discrimination. 
Remand is also appropriate to address the issue of Title VII retaliation.  The 
District Court reasoned that an adverse employment action was limited to ―a significant 
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits.‖  Id. at *11 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 
(1998)).  This standard—pertaining to direct employers—failed to account for actions 
that a labor organization could take ―to dissuade employees from complaining or 
assisting in complaints about discrimination.‖  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
White, 548 U.S. 53, 70 (2006).  Though the record contains almost no information about 
the letter Durkalec forwarded to the press, that action arguably could have sufficed as a 
retaliatory action under the law, and more factual analysis is necessary. 
We thus vacate the District Court‘s order granting summary judgment, and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
     
 
